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Beyond Work Ethic:  
Religion, Individual, and Political Preferences†
By Christoph Basten and Frank Betz*
We investigate the effect of Reformed Protestantism, relative to 
Catholicism, on preferences for leisure, and for redistribution and 
intervention in the economy. We use a Fuzzy Spatial Regression 
Discontinuity Design to exploit a historical quasi-experiment in 
Western Switzerland, where in the sixteenth century a hitherto 
homogeneous region was split and one part assigned to adopt 
Protestantism. We find that Reformed Protestantism reduces refer-
enda voting for more leisure by 14, redistribution by 5, and govern-
ment intervention by 7 percentage points. These preferences translate 
into higher per capita income as well as greater income inequality. 
(JEL D12, D31, D72, H23, N33, Z12)
St. Paul’s ‘He who will not work shall not eat’ holds unconditionally for 
everyone. Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace. Here 
the difference from the mediæval view-point becomes quite evident. 
 — Max Weber, 1930
Can different religions lead to different economic or political preferences? Max Weber famously claimed in his 1904 classic “The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism” that, in contrast to Catholicism, “Ascetic Protestantism” had 
cultivated a set of preferences conducive to the establishment of capitalism in north-
ern Europe. This includes on the one hand the “work ethic” hypothesis, examined 
by a lively recent literature in economics, whereby Protestantism is claimed to have 
nurtured preferences for hard work and thus resulted in greater economic prosperity. 
It also includes, hitherto less discussed, stronger preferences for self-reliance, and 
hence less support for redistribution and government intervention in the economy.
Empirical results on the “work ethic” hypothesis by Cantoni (2010), Becker 
and Woessmann (2009), and Spenkuch (2010) are mixed. Common to all three 
papers however is their focus on Germany, whose Protestants adhere mostly to the 
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Lutheran variant of Protestantism, whereas Weber (1930) makes it clear that his 
famous hypothesis concerns explicitly not the Lutheran, but the Reformed variant, 
born with the Swiss rather than the German Reformation. As laid out in chapter II of 
his classic, he counts as Reformed the variants of Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, 
and Baptism.1, 2 This is the first dimension in which we add to the existing literature: 
we focus specifically on Switzerland with its Reformed variant of Protestantism. 
In fact, we focus precisely on that region in the South West, which was first con-
verted to Calvinism and from where Calvinism later spread to other countries such 
as England or the New World.
Our second contribution to the economic literature on the work ethic hypothesis 
is that we use voting in referenda as direct measures of preferences. Studies on the 
subject often examine the relationship between outcomes such as economic perfor-
mance and religious affiliation. But lacking data on attitudes, they cannot provide 
direct evidence on the work ethic channel posited by Weber.
But this paper goes beyond providing another evaluation of the work ethic 
hypothesis with a different sample and identification strategy: based on an analysis 
of Weber (1930) as well as more recent work in the other social sciences, we show 
that Max Weber’s classic includes hypotheses not only about work ethic, but also 
about political preferences, with far-ranging implications for the choice of political 
institutions and therewith also on economic outcomes like income inequality. In 
particular, this literature suggests that, relative to Roman Catholicism, Reformed 
Protestantism has curbed preferences for redistribution and for government inter-
vention in the economy.
Switzerland is well suited to study how religion affects politics and the econ-
omy as it is one of the few countries exhibiting genuine within-country variation 
in religion. In the early modern period, religious unity was critical for political sta-
bility. Hence, most of the emerging European territorial states enforced adherence 
to a single religion on what eventually became the national level. In Switzerland, 
however, cantons were the most important political unit, and consequently religious 
uniformity was enforced at the canton-level. Early in the sixteenth century, some 
cantons adopted the Reformation whereas others did not, which leaves us with both 
a treatment and a control group.
Switzerland, however, exhibits not only religious variation, it is also a geographi-
cally and institutionally diverse country. As institutions and geography affect long-
run economic performance, they potentially confound the results, and the decision 
to adopt the Reformation was indeed correlated with geography and institutions. 
Almost the entire rural and mountainous center of the Confederation remained 
Catholic. Among the urban Confederates, those ruled by patricians were more likely 
to remain Catholic whereas cities with a guild regime embraced Protestantism. To 
address this issue, we focus on an institutionally and geographically homogeneous 
subset of the Confederation: the area in western Switzerland that is comprised of the 
present day cantons of Vaud and Fribourg.
1 See especially pages 41, 42, 44, and 46.
2 A recent paper which deals more explicitly with the difference between Reformed and Lutheran Protestantism 
is Bai and Kung (2011), which analyzes the impact of Protestantism in China.
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In this setting, the Reformation process led to exogenous variation in religion. 
Until 1476, the region was ruled by the duke of Savoy. Then, however, the Swiss 
defeated Burgundy and its ally Savoy in the Burgundy Wars. The peace negotiations 
awarded the eastern half of the region to the city republic of Fribourg, whereas the 
western part fell to the city republic of Berne. When Protestant ideas spread in the 
1520s the Fribourg magistrates decided to stay with the old faith, whereas Berne 
eventually adopted the new religion. By contrast, when Berne in 1536 finally con-
quered what is now the canton of Vaud, it imposed Protestantism on its new subjects. 
Thereby we rule out self-selection into religious form.
Figure 1 shows the area of interest, covering only 4,883 square kilometers (km2) 
or about 4.5 percent of Swiss territory. This makes the entire area quite homog-
enous. The exceptions are more mountains in the East of Fribourg (see Figure 2) 
and proximity to Geneva and France in the West of Vaud. To address both of these 
potential confounding factors, we implement a Spatial Regression Discontinuity 
Design around the historical religious border.
Our empirical results suggest that ceteris paribus in a Reformed Protestant elec-
torate support for increasing leisure time will be about 13.5 percentage points lower 
than in a Catholic electorate, and support for redistribution and government inter-
vention will be respectively 5.1 and 6.5 percentage points lower. These results are 
robust to varying our methodology along all relevant dimensions. There is some, 
albeit less strong evidence that these different preferences manifest themselves 
also in differences in economic outcomes: in historically Protestant municipalities, 





Figure 1. Catholic Area in the Northeast, Protestant in South and West;  
Lake Geneva Is in the South and Lake Neuchatel in the North
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 standard deviation) higher and the Gini coefficient of income inequality is 0.13 units 
(more than 2 standard deviations) higher.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces theoretical considerations 
and previous work on religion, politics, and the economy. Section II provides a brief 
account of the Swiss Reformation and presents the  quasi-experiment. In Section III, 
−20 0 20 40 60
−20 0 20 40 60
−20 0 20 40 60
IK optimal bandwidth: 5.01 km
Bandwidth 10 km
Bandwidth 20 km


















Walking distance in kilometers














Figure 2. Average Altitude in Meters above Sea Level Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border, 
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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we introduce the data. Section IV presents results, and Section V concludes. The 
online Appendix provides more detailed information on the referenda used and a 
wide range of robustness checks. Besides the set of robustness checks common for 
any Regression Discontinuity Design, it looks at the role of education, possible dif-
ferences between treatment and control group in secularization, and the coincidence 
of the religious border with present-day political borders.
I. Religion, Politics, and the Economy
A. The Hypothesis of a Protestant “Work Ethic”
In recent years, Weber’s hypothesis of a “Protestant work ethic” has received par-
ticular attention by economists. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Weber (1930) argues that the rise of capitalism was facilitated by “Ascetic 
Protestantism.” The religion provided a spiritual sanction for work in a calling and 
thus made hard work and the acquisition of wealth an end in itself: “Labour came 
to be considered in itself the end of life, ordained as such by God. St. Paul’s ‘He 
who will not work shall not eat’ holds unconditionally for everyone.” Weber con-
trasts this new spirit of capitalism with the work attitude prevailing at the time and 
throughout most of human history, designated traditionalism, which aimed merely 
at maintaining the accustomed standard of living.
Weber considers “Ascetic Protestantism” to comprise Calvinism, Pietism, 
Methodism, and various Baptist sects, but not Lutheranism, which according to him 
embodies a traditionalist set of work norms. In Calvinism, the religious motives 
behind wordly asceticism appear in its starkest form. Characteristic of Calvinism is 
the doctrine of predestination, which holds that by his grace God has elected a small 
share of humanity for everlasting life and by his justice has condemned the rest to 
everlasting death. For believers the doctrine of predestination resulted in a crisis 
of proof: How do I know that I am one of the elect? In response, practical pastoral 
work declared it a duty to consider oneself chosen, and to resort to intense worldly 
activity so as to disperse any doubts. “However useless good works might be as a 
means of attaining salvation [...] nevertheless, they are indispensable as a sign of 
election.” In sum, Ascetic Protestantism encouraged the accumulation of wealth, 
which it regarded as a sign of God’s blessing, but restricted consumption. Hard work 
in a worldly calling is sanctified as the surest means to attain certainty of salvation.
While this hypothesis has found a great deal of attention recently, empirical 
results remain mixed. While Cantoni (2010) does not find Protestantism to affect 
economic prosperity in nineteenth century Prussia, Becker and Woessmann (2009) 
do find a positive effect of Protestantism on economic prosperity there, but argue 
that most of that can be explained by its positive effect on literacy, thus leaving little 
scope for Weber’s work ethic channel.
Studying the nineteenth century in Switzerland, Boppart et al. (2008) find that 
interconfessional differences in education did only exist in rural environments, 
but  disappear in economically more advanced ones. Boppart, Falkinger, and 
Grossmann (2010) show that where Protestants are educationally more advanced 
than Catholics, they are so not only in reading but also in other fields, which Boppart, 
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Falkinger, and Grossmann (2010) interpret as evidence against an education policy 
aimed primarily at facilitating the ability to read the bible. Instead, they argue that 
compared to Catholics Protestants may have been more aware of the economic 
benefits of education.
B. Religion and Political Preferences
But beyond suggesting to focus on a region characterized by predominantly 
Reformed Protestantism, the reading of Weber (1930) is illustrative also for another 
reason: when, as in the passages quoted above, Weber points to the emphasis in the 
Reformed Faith that “He who will not work shall not eat,” this suggests that those 
educated in this new faith should also be less sympathetic to redistribution.
Such a connection between religion on the one hand and political preferences 
and systems on the other hand has also been suggested in a more recent literature 
in political science, starting with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) comparative analysis 
of welfare states, in which he contrasts the “Liberal” (minimum) type of welfare 
state, said to be characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon countries, with two larger types, 
the “Social-Democratic” or “Universal” one typical of the Scandinavian countries 
and the “Conservative” type found in much of Continental Europe. Manow (2002) 
links the origins of these three stylized types explicitly to the influence of respec-
tively Reformed Protestant, Lutheran Protestant, and Catholic social teaching. He 
argues that Reformed Protestantism’s strong anti-statism has, in many countries, 
retarded the development of the welfare state. Referring to Switzerland in particular, 
he stresses that Reformed Protestantism saw state help as subsidiary to voluntary 
collective self help. Manow (2002) follows Weber in emphasizing that the anti-state 
stance is characteristic of Reformed but not of Lutheran Protestantism.
The possible relationship between culture and political preferences has also 
found some attention in the recent literature in economics. Most of this literature 
is surveyed in Alesina and Giuliano (2010) who, in their own analysis with data 
from the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey, find that Protestantism 
tends to decrease and Catholicism tends to increase preferences for redistribution. 
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) established a causal effect of culture on preferences for 
redistribution by analyzing the attitudes of immigrants within Europe from differ-
ent countries of origin. Most recently, Eugster et al. (2011) show that French- and 
Italian-speaking Swiss exhibit on average about 7 percent greater support for redis-
tribution than German-speaking Swiss.
The literature dealing specifically with religion and government-run redistri-
bution has so far mostly emphasized the possible substitutability between insur-
ance through religion and insurance through government, see for instance Dehejia, 
DeLeire, and Luttmer (2007) or Huber and Stanig (2011). Yet these papers differen-
tiate little between different religions, but are rather about religiousness in general. 
An exception here is Arrunada (2010), who finds that Protestants and Catholics do 
not exhibit significant differences in terms of their work ethic, but do exhibit differ-
ent social attitudes.
Lastly, one may question whether it is reasonable to use contemporary data to 
study the effects of Protestantism on work ethic and political preferences, given 
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that most European countries have experienced multiple waves of secularization 
in recent decades. Swiss sociologist Geser (2004) however argues that “politi-
cal mentalities and preferences with confessional roots can remain valid and be 
transmitted (through mechanisms of implicit socialization) even when the explicit 
religious beliefs, practices and institutions, to which the preferences go back, have 
largely ceased to exist and to be effective.” 3 Secularization can also lead to biased 
estimates if, in the treatment group, it is either more or less prevalent than in the 
control group. In the online Appendix, we investigate this and find no evidence of 
differential secularization.
II. Empirical Strategy
A. The Swiss Reformation
The Swiss Reformation was started in Zurich in 1519 by head priest Huldrych 
Zwingli. Although his theology quickly led to conflict with the Roman Church, he 
eventually won the support of the city’s magistrates. After converting Zurich, he 
and his friends also sought to expand the new faith into other parts of present-day 
Switzerland. Regional differences notwithstanding, historian Gordon (2002) dis-
cerns a common pattern of these efforts:
The Swiss would have remained Catholic, had not a small minority suc-
ceeded in persuading them that the old religion was wrong [...] success 
was dependent on winning over the magistrates, who would then impose 
the new religion.
In the late 1520s, tension between Catholics and Protestants increased and in 
1531 Protestants and Catholics clashed in the Second War of Kappel, which ended 
with Protestant defeat and Zwingli’s death. The peace confirmed each canton’s right 
to abide by its own faith, thus anticipating the “cuius regio, eius religio” principle 
which at the 1555 Peace of Augsburg was established also for the Holy Roman 
Empire. The resulting spatial distribution of the two religions—with Protestantism 
in Zurich, Berne, Basel, and Schaffhausen; Catholicism in Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, 
Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Solothurn; and Bi-Confessionalism in Appenzell 
and Glarus—then remained largely untouched until 1848, when freedom of move-
ment was granted and between-canton migration started to somewhat loosen confes-
sional milieus (von Greyerz and Bischof 2007).
B. Determinants of Adopting the Reformation
But why had the local elites of different cantons chosen different confessions? 
At first sight, their choices depended largely on geopolitical considerations, as 
some cantons feared that Zurich would exploit the Reformation to pursue her hege-
monic interests. Yet beyond geopolitical considerations, analysis reveals that the 
3 Our translation from German. For more on this, see also Geser (2008).
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more mountainous regions were more likely to remain Catholic. A major reason 
was Zwingli’s condemnation of mercenary service, on which however the more 
rural regions depended for their income. This poses a challenge for identification 
of a causal effect of religion on attitudes and outcomes today: the rural and moun-
tainous landscape as well as the strong direct democratic traditions in the center 
of Switzerland may have an impact on mentalities today that we cannot perfectly 
control for.
A second potential source of bias are institutions: amongst the city republics 
in the Swiss Confederation, it turns out that all those with a guild regime became 
Protestant, whereas all patrician ones, except for Berne, remained Catholic. But 
guild regimes did also exhibit a higher degree of social mobility and so cities with a 
guild regime are likely to have differed already ex ante.
A final concern stems from the fact that, since the Reformation was initially 
and during most of the territorial competition with Catholicism, a German-
speaking movement,4 its spread is largely restricted to the German-speaking parts 
of Switzerland, whereas the French- and Italian-speaking areas are predominantly 
Catholic. This might lead one to worry that differences in preferences might, 
at least partly, be due to different cultural influences from the German- and the 
French- or Italian-speaking neighboring countries, respectively, which were found 
to matter for preferences in Brügger, Lalive, and Zweimüller (2009) and Eugster 
et al. (2011).5
C. Exogenous Assignment in the South-West
Fortunately, these concerns can be circumvented by focusing on a region in the 
South-West of present-day Switzerland that, as we shall show, was homogeneous 
until the beginning of the sixteenth century, but was then split into two parts assigned 
different religions. The region was subject territory of the Roman Catholic kingdom 
of Burgundy until the late fifteenth century. Then, however, the Swiss Confederacy 
won the Burgundy War and in the 1476 Peace Congress was granted most of what is 
now the South-Western part of Switzerland.6 After the conquest, the new territories 
were initially jointly ruled by all Swiss Confederates, but then the city republics of 
Berne and Fribourg decided to pay the others off and to divide the region amongst 
the two of them: the Eastern part thus fell to Fribourg and the Western one to Berne.
As the latter had recently become Protestant, the new rulers—in order to facilitate 
governance of their new territories—imposed (initially Zwinglian) Protestantism 
everywhere, so that the new religious authorities would all be based in Berne rather 
than Rome, and could more easily be persuaded to preach citizens to obey also 
the worldly authorities of Berne. Of course the question arises whether the region 
would not have become Protestant anyway, but the historical accounts suggest 
4 The Swiss Reformation was started by Zwingli in German-speaking Zurich, and French-speaking Jean Calvin 
became involved only after Zwingli’s death.
5 Further accounts of the assignment of religion in Switzerland in general can be found in Moeller (1978), 
Schaab (1993) and Schindling and Ziegler (1989).
6 The part furthest in the West was initially given to the duke of Savoy, an ally of Burgundy, but was also con-
quered by Berne in 1536.
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 otherwise: as late as in 1534, the deliberative assembly of Vaud decided explicitly 
that they would like to remain Catholic,7 and the forced conversion to Protestantism 
led to riots. According to Bruening (2005), the inhabitants of the Vaud did not even 
appear to be aware of the Reformation before 1525. A major reason for ignorance 
of the Reformation was language: most of the Reformation documents had been 
published in German, and of those few (Lutheran) Protestant pamphlets published 
in French none had been printed in Switzerland.8
D. Equality at Baseline
For our setup to constitute a valid quasi-experiment, treatment and control region 
must have been statistically identical at the baseline, i.e., before the event. A first 
dimension to look at, in view of Weber’s hypothesis, is economic prosperity. Data on 
per capita income in this period are difficult to come by and therefore studies such 
as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) use as a proxy data on population den-
sity, frequently from Bairoch, Batou, and Chèvre (1988). In our setup, these cover 
only the largest towns, but fortunately Ammann (1937) has compiled data on the 
number of fireplaces per parish in the fifteenth century, based on parish visitations in 
the dioceses of Geneva and Lausanne. These provide a useful proxy for population 
density and hence economic development at the time. Table 1 shows that there is no 
significant difference between our two areas in the number of fireplaces per parish.
Looking at cultural factors other than religion, both areas are French-speaking, 
except for the Lake District and parts of the Sense district in the Catholic part, which 
are German-speaking. To ensure homogeneity with regard to language, we drop the 
German-speaking municipalities from the baseline sample.
Institutionally, both areas were subject territory of Burgundy and Savoy before 
the experiment.9 Different developments after the experiment can typically be inter-
preted as one of the outcomes, or can be expected to cancel out in sufficiently large 
samples. However, an added concern arises in our setup because in 1803 the two 
areas became separate cantons (states) of Switzerland, Vaud and Fribourg. If any 
relevant event that occurred between 1803 and today affected one canton but not 
the other, then it may confound our results. In this case, present-day differences 
may have reasons other than religion. To probe this, the online Appendix exploits 
a separate natural experiment in which the former district of Murten, in the North 
of the otherwise Catholic canton of Fribourg, did remain predominantly Protestant. 
The effects of Protestantism found there are consistent with those found in the full 
sample. This strongly suggests that the reason underlying our results is indeed 
Protestantism.
A final dimension to analyze is geography. Here our area of interest, which has a 
maximum East-West extension of only about 100 km, is largely situated on the Swiss 
Plateau, a mostly hilly region bounded by the Jura Mountains in the  North-East 
7 For details, see Feller (1953, 379).
8 See Bruening (2005), as well as Holenstein (2006). For Catholic Fribourg on the other hand, Guggisberg 
(1987) writes that in 1522 the authorities decided to severely punish those found to be Protestant and that “the 
numerous repressive measures taken by the authorities reflect the presence of a lively reforming opposition.”
9 For details, see Holenstein (2009).
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and the Alps in the South. Yet average geography in the two areas as a whole does 
exhibit some differences because the far East is somewhat more mountainous. At the 
same time, in the West the Vaud shares a common border with France and is on aver-
age closer to the city of Geneva. However, Figure 1 suggests how to address these 
issues. By implementing a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design, we can focus 
on those municipalities near the historical religious border and which are thus statis-
tically identical in terms of the factors mentioned above. Indeed, Figure 2 confirms 
that while altitude is on average higher in the East, there is no significant difference 
nearby the border.
E. A Spatial Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
The Regression Discontinuity Design exploits the fact that the assignment of 
Protestantism in the sixteenth century and therefore also the “treatment” of present-
day Protestantism change discontinuously at the historical religious border, whereas 
the confounding factors described above can be expected to change only continu-
ously. This allows us to identify the causal effect of Protestantism as the discontinu-
ous change in outcomes at this border, while controlling with sufficient flexibility 
for the effect correlated with the forcing variable, distance from the border per se.10 
The paper methodologically closest to ours is Brügger, Lalive, and Zweimüller 
(2009) who analyze the impact of Latin languages (French, Italian, or Romansh), 
relative to German, on work attitudes in Switzerland using distance to the language 
frontier as forcing variable.
As the share of Protestants does not jump from zero to one at the border, we have 
what Trochim (1984) called a “Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design,” in which 
the causal effect of present-day Protestantism is identified by instrumenting the latter 
with the indicator for whether a municipality had been assigned Protestantism in the 
sixteenth century. Put differently, the hypothetical effect on our outcomes of interest 
10 For a recent summary of papers implementing such a design with various forcing variables, see for instance 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) or Lee and Lemieux (2010).
Table 1—Summary Statistics for the Main Estimation Sample
Protestant Catholic Compared
Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference T
Share Protestants 1980 83.25 11.41 84 9.43 5.69 49 73.82 49.63
Share no religious affiliation 1980 2.95 2.73 84 1.73 1.5 49 1.22 3.33
Altitude in m 639.61 113.56 84 642.59 120.23 49 −2.98 −0.14
Fireplaces per square km in 1416 12.29 22.59 136 11.65 15.81 56 0.64 0.22
Preferences for leisure 39.51 5.72 84 48.24 4.77 49 −8.73 −9.44
Preferences for redistribution 39.19 5.03 84 43.05 2.63 49 −3.86 −5.8
Preferences for intervention 47.09 3.37 84 52.64 2.94 49 −5.56 −9.96
Average income (CHF), 1980–2000 47,253.27 5,342.36 84 43,692.71 3,369.17 49 3,560.56 4.71
Gini coefficient 1996 0.37 0.05 84 0.3 0.03 49 0.07 9.28
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics for our main estimation sample. This includes all municipalities 
situated within 5.03 km of the next “border point” (i.e., intercept between a road and the border). Statistics on the 
number of fireplaces per km2 in 1416 refer to the entire region, given the smaller sample size in 1416. The differ-
ence is also insignificant when we restrict to the 5.03 km bandwidth per side.
VOL. 5 NO. 3 77BASTEN AND BETZ: RELIGION, INDIVIDUAL, AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES
of moving from a municipality with 0 percent Protestants to one with 100 percent 
Protestants is given by the jump at the border in those outcomes (the “Reduced-
Form” or “Intention-to-Treat” effect), divided by the jump at the border in the share 
of Protestants (the “First-Stage effect”). To implement the Spatial Fuzzy Regression 
Discontinuity Design, we have to decide how to measure distance from the border. 
Dell (2010), analyzing the impact of forced labor in Peru, uses great-circle distance, 
whereas Brügger, Lalive, and Zweimüller (2009) use driving distance. We think that 
driving or walking distance better proxies economic distance than great circle dis-
tance, as the latter does not take into account the barriers posed by mountain ranges 
or rivers. Thus we consider walking distance the best possible proxy for historical 
travel distance and use great circle distance in a robustness check covered in the 
online Appendix.
III. Data
To measure both “self-regarding” preferences about the choice between more 
leisure and more income, and “other-regarding” or “social” preferences about politi-
cal issues like redistribution and government intervention in the economy, we use 
the fraction of citizens in each municipality voting for different policy proposals on 
these issues in different Swiss referenda. The Swiss system of direct democracy, 
with its many referenda, is one of the rare cases that come close to the system of 
“Pure Majority Rule” often assumed in political economy models like in Persson 
and Tabellini (2000): citizens vote directly on specific policies, choosing between 
pairs of alternatives, and there is an “open agenda,” as any sufficiently large group 
of citizens can demand a referendum on an issue. Since voting outcomes are directly 
put into policy, the voting data may be considered a better measure of preferences 
than mere survey data.
For all referenda held from 1980 onwards, the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics 
provides voting data by municipality level on its website.11 Given this list, we have 
researched the precise questions put to vote to decide which referenda can be clas-
sified as being about leisure, redistribution or intervention, and whether the refer-
endum proposed more or less thereof. Information on most referenda is publicly 
available on the website of the Swiss Federal Chancellery,12 and additional infor-
mation can be found in appendix E of Kaufmann and Waters (2004), as well as on 
the Internet.
In Table 1 of the online Appendix, we provide a complete list of all referenda 
considered, giving for each referendum its official Federal Statistical Office (FSO) 
indicator (a counter of all federal referenda held since 1848), the date, the official 
title in German, and a brief summary of the question in English. We also indicate 
for which of four different reasons the referendum was held: firstly there is the 
“Volksinitiative,” a people’s initiative started by a sufficiently large group of citi-
zens. Secondly the “Gegenentwurf,” a counterproposal made by the government 
in response to a people’s initiative: typically a counterproposal will go in the same 
11 http://www.bfs.admin.ch.
12 http://www.bk.admin.ch.
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direction as the people’s initiative but will be relatively less radical, i.e., deviate less 
from the status quo. Citizens will then on the same day vote on both proposals and 
also vote on which proposal they would prefer if both receive a majority of votes, 
although sometimes the initial initiative is withdrawn once a satisfactory counter-
proposal has been made. Thirdly, a “Fakultatives Referendum,” optional referen-
dum, is held when a sufficiently large group of citizens decides to challenge a law 
proposed by the government. And finally there is an “Obligatorisches,” obligatory, 
referendum when the government wishes to make changes to the constitution.
We are interested in referenda that can serve as a measure of preferences for 
leisure, redistribution and intervention. Leisure referenda proposed, for instance, 
to prolong the length of legally required vacation (e.g., FSO 329), to lower the 
official retirement age (e.g., FSO 352), or to cut weekly working time (e.g., FSO 
354). Referenda on redistribution were about such issues as expanding old age and 
disability insurance (e.g., FSO 423), cutting unemployment insurance benefits (e.g., 
FSO 437), or introducing a capital gains tax (e.g., FSO 484). Finally, referenda on 
intervention dealt with price regulation in general (e.g., FSO 307), in the market 
for renting (e.g., FSO 342), or in agriculture (e.g., FSO 418). Overall, we have 
8 referenda on leisure, 24 on redistribution, and 12 on intervention. Most refer-
enda proposed more leisure, more redistribution or more intervention, but a few 
proposed less. In these cases, we used the fraction voting against instead of the frac-
tion voting in favor of the proposal. For the results displayed in this paper, we have 
computed the three summary measures “Preferences for Leisure,” “Preferences for 
Redistribution,” and “Preferences for Intervention” as averages of these referenda, 
and in what follows we focus on these outcome variables, but Table 2 of the online 
Appendix displays also the results for each of the 44 separate referenda.
We also consider two economic outcomes. The first is each municipality’s total 
pre-tax income, divided by the number of taxpayers.13 We have information on 
this for every other year between 1980 and 2000, so we use the average across all 
20 years for our main analysis and we show results for various individual years in 
our online Appendix. Since the tax statistics do not contain direct information on 
income inequality, we take information on the Gini coefficient of income inequal-
ity within each municipality from appendix D of Ecoplan (2004), which refer to 
tax period 1995–1996. These are based on the “Equivalent Income,” the sum of all 
incomes in a household divided by the number of “equivalent” persons, counting the 
first member with weight 1, each further adult with weight 0.5 and each child with 
weight 0.3.
The explanatory variable of interest is given by a municipality’s share of 
Protes- tants. Religious affiliation is recorded every ten years by the Swiss  census, 
and since our referenda go back to 1981, we use the 1980 census. Today, of 
course not all inhabitants of Switzerland are affiliated with either the Catholic 
or the Protestant Church, and since our quasi-experiment provides us with only 
13 In particular, we use “Reineinkommen,” which deducts expenditure on insurance premiums and loan inter-
est payments, but not child deductions, as is the case for the other available variable, “Steuerbares Einkommen” 
or taxable income. For details, see the documentation on the Federal Tax Administration website, http://www.estv.
admin.ch.
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one instrument, for Protestantism, we use as “treatment” variable the share of 
Protestants out of those either Catholic or Protestant. This amounts to assigning 
those with neither affiliation to the two confessions in the same proportion as is 
found amongst those with either affiliation. The census provides us also with a 
number of further covariates used in the robustness checks in the online Appendix: 
population density, the shares who are respectively foreign, married and male, the 




Table 2 and Figure 3 present first stage results. The econometric specifications 
differ only in terms of bandwidth. Column 1, and the first panel of Figure 3, show 
results for the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) optimal bandwidth. The 
remaining columns present results for fixed bandwidths of 10 km and 20 km respec-
tively, which the graphs suggest as sensible bandwidth numbers. Figure 3 shows 
clearly that the share of Protestants changes discontinuously at the border. The IK 
estimate of the effect equals 67 percentage points, based on a bandwidth of 5.01 km. 
The larger bandwidths result in slightly larger estimates ranging from 73 percentage 
points to 76 percentage points. The results testify to the strong persistence of reli-
gion. Municipalities where, in 1536, Berne had imposed Protestantism had a 67 to 
76 percentage points higher share of Protestants in 1980, almost 450 years after the 
initial assignment. It is therefore safe to conclude that the IV estimates do not suffer 
from a weak instruments problem.
Table 2—First Stage Results
Share of Protestants Share of Protestants Share of Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) 
T 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.76***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance 0.02*** 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
T × distance −0.01 −0.00 −0.01***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
BW 5.01 10 20
Observations 133 208 305
Notes: T is an indicator for whether a municipality is on the historically Protestant side of the 
border; “Distance” is walking distance to the closest border point in kilometers. In column 1, 
bandwidth in kilometers is chosen optimally following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). 
Columns 2 and 3 use alternative bandwidths of respectively 10 km and 20 km. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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B. Main Outcomes
Table 3 presents estimates of the intention-to-treat effect. We first compute the 
Imbens and Kalyanarman (2012) optimal bandwidth for each of the five outcomes. 
Then we use for all reported regressions the same average of these five optimal band-
widths, so as to make results directly comparable across five outcomes. Column 1 
Catholic                         Protestant
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Figure 3. Share of Protestants Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border,  
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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and Figure 4 are concerned with Weber’s work ethic hypothesis. The IK estimate 
of the effect equals 9 percentage points and is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Figure 4 provides clear evidence of a discontinuous change in voting behavior at 
the border. Moreover, comparable changes do not exist within either the Catholic or 
the Protestant subregion. Column 2 presents results on our measure of preferences 
for redistribution, which is 3.4 percentage points lower on the Protestant side of 
the border. Figure 5 provides clear evidence of a discontinuity at the canton border. 
Concerning preferences for intervention the difference amounts to 4.4 percentage 
points, as shown in column 3 and Figure 6. Table 2 of the online Appendix presents 
results also on individual referenda. It shows that while not every single referendum 
does yield a statistically significant coefficient within our narrow-bandwidth esti-
mation sample, the direction of the coefficients is generally quite robust, so that the 
results obtained for our summary measures would not deviate much if we used only 
a subset of these referenda.
It is interesting to compare these results to those obtained by Brügger, Lalive, and 
Zweimüller (2009) and Eugster et al. (2011), who analyze the effect of Switzerland’s 
other main cultural divide, language, on respectively work attitudes and preferences 
for redistribution. While they use only a subset of the referenda considered here and 
use much wider bandwidths of 25 km and 50 km, their approach is also a Regression 
Discontinuity Design and hence largely comparable. Since their first-stage is some-
what larger than ours,14 we compare Reduced-Form (Intention-to-Treat) coefficients. 
Here the average effect of language on work attitudes, according to Brügger, Lalive, 
and Zweimüller (2009, table 2), is about 16 percentage points, and thus larger than 
14 See Brügger, Lalive, and Zweimüller (2009, table 12); or Eugster et al. (2011, table A1).











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T −9.03*** −3.40** −4.35*** 2.80* 0.08***
(2.22) (1.50) (1.21) (1.52) (0.02)
Distance 0.21 0.36 −0.27 −0.42 0.00
(0.61) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31) (0.00)
T × distance −0.29 −0.88 0.05 1.11* −0.01*
(0.86) (0.59) (0.45) (0.60) (0.01)
Constant 48.73*** 43.88*** 52.00*** 42.72*** 0.31***
(1.60) (0.79) (0.90) (1.01) (0.01)
IK OB 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Observations 133 133 133 133 133
Notes: T is an indicator for whether a municipality is on the historically Protestant side of the border; “Distance” is 
walking distance to the closest border point in kilometers; Bandwidth in kilometers is chosen optimally following 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Preferences in columns 1, 2, and 3 are averages of the respective referenda listed 
in Table 1 of the online Appendix. Column 4 uses the average across the years 1980–2000 of each municipality’s 
pre-tax income divided by the number of taxpayers. Column 5 uses the Gini coefficient of income inequality, taken 
from Ecoplan (2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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our estimate of 9 percentage points. A similar pattern applies to the effect on prefer-
ences for redistribution, which equals about 7–8 percentage points in their paper.15
15 See Eugster et al. (2011, table 3, column 4), which has the specification closest to ours with a bandwidth of 
25 km and a linear control function.
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Figure 4. Preferences for Leisure Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border,  
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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The remaining columns of Table 3 are concerned with economic outcomes. 
Column 4, and Figure 7 then show the results for income per capita. We find that on 
the Protestant side income per capita is about CHF 2,800 or about half a standard 
deviation higher. The difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but 
as Figure 7 does not exhibit a clear discontinuity at the border, we prefer to view these 
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Figure 5. Preferences for Redistribution Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border,  
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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results as merely suggestive. This result may be indicative of general equilibrium 
effects. Whereas in front of the ballot box people can express their preferences inde-
pendent of the preferences of others, an integrated market imposes a certain degree 
of uniformity on economic behavior. Table 4 of the online Appendix provides addi-
tional evidence for the income effect in different years. The Protestant side exhibits 
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Figure 6. Preferences for Intervention Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border,  
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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higher incomes in all years and at all bandwidths we consider, though the differ-
ence is not always significant especially when bandwidths are small. Column 5 and 
Figure 8 are concerned with inequality. The Gini coefficient is 0.08 points higher 
on the Protestant side of the border, which is significant at the 1 percent level. As 
Figure 8 shows, the change at the border is indeed discontinuous.
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IK estimate: 2.80, standard error: 1.52, N: 133
Average income 1980−2000
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Figure 7. Average Net Income per Head Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border,  
Bandwidth 5 km; Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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Table 4 presents the corresponding instrumental-variable (IV) or second-stage 
estimates, given by the reduced-form or intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate scaled by 
the first stage effect. With a first stage effect of 0.69 at bandwidth 5 km, the IV esti-
mates are about 45 percent larger than the ITT results. Thus preferences for leisure 
are about 13.5, preferences for redistribution 5.1 and preferences for intervention 
6.5 percentage points weaker in the Protestant part. Income per capita is CHF 4,170 
and income inequality is 0.13 units higher.
Table 5 presents results for alternative bandwidths of 10 km and 20 km as shown 
in the lower panels of Figures 4–8. The differences in preferences tend to increase 
slightly with bandwidth. With an estimate of 4,600 CHF at a bandwidth of 20 km 
compared to 2,800 CHF in Table 3, the increase in income differences is more pro-
nounced. The difference in the Gini coefficients remains at 0.07 for both the 10 km 
and the 20 km bandwidth.
C. Robustness Checks
In the online Appendix, we subject the analysis to additional robustness checks. 
Some concern the technical implementation of our setup. We show that the results 
are robust with respect to using a triangular instead of a rectangular kernel, to using 
great-circle distance instead of walking distance, and to controlling separately 
for differences in latitude and longitude. If in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
 variables other than those affected by the assignment exhibit discontinuous changes 
at the threshold, this may question the validity of the setup. The online Appendix 
investigates whether this applies to our case. We show that population density, the 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Protestants −13.46*** −5.06** −6.49*** 4.17* 0.13***
(3.11) (2.13) (1.71) (2.29) (0.03)
Distance 0.44 0.44 −0.16 −0.49 −0.00
(0.63) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.00)
T × distance −0.36 −0.91 0.01 1.14* −0.01
(0.80) (0.55) (0.43) (0.60) (0.01)
Constant 50.53*** 44.56*** 52.87*** 42.16*** 0.29***
(1.89) (0.94) (1.05) (1.20) (0.01)
IK OB 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Observations 133 133 133 133 133
Notes: “Share Protestants” is the share of Protestants amongst those either Protestant or Catholic, as of the 1980 
census. The coefficients give the estimated difference between a fully Protestant and a fully Catholic municipal-
ity. The share of Protestants is instrumented with T, an indicator for whether a municipality is on the historically 
Protestant side of the border; “Distance” is walking distance to the closest border point in kilometers; Bandwidth 
in kilometers is chosen optimally following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Preferences in columns 1, 2, and 3 
are averages of the individual referenda listed in Table 1 of the online Appendix. Column 4 uses the average across 
the years 1980–2000 of each municipality’s pre-tax income divided by the number of taxpayers. Column 5 uses the 
Gini coefficient of income inequality, taken from Ecoplan (2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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share of foreigners, the share of married inhabitants, the share of males and the share 
of individuals without religious affiliation do not exhibit a discontinuous change at 
the border.
The validity of the identification mechanism may also be questioned because the 
assignment described above has led not only to differences in present-day religion, 
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Figure 8. Gini Coefficient Conditional on Walking Distance to the Border, Bandwidth 5 km;  
Prediction from Linear Regression, Including 95 Percent Prediction Interval
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but has in addition implied that the two areas became separate Swiss cantons in 
1803. We therefore need to ask whether shocks asymmetrically affecting the cantons 
would cause voting behavior to differ for reasons other than religion. If so, the exclu-
sion restriction of our instrumental-variable design would be violated. Fortunately, 
we can investigate this issue empirically. Areas where the Swiss had won important 
battles of the Burgundy Wars later fell to Berne and Fribourg who administered 
them jointly. One such territorry, German-speaking Murten, located in the North-
West of the present day canton of Fribourg, was pressured by Berne into adopting 
the Reformation. Thus, we have intra-cantonal variation in religion and can compare 
the German-speaking Protestant municipalities of Fribourg to the German-speaking 
Catholic municipalities. The online Appendix shows that our main results hold also 
within the canton of Fribourg, which suggests that they do indeed represent the 
long-term impact of Protestantism. Finally, the online Appendix investigates the 
role of education as a mediating factor. The findings in Becker and Woessmann 
(2009) raise the question whether the identified effect of religion on work and politi-
cal preferences operates at least partly through education: Has there been a promo-
tion of education also in Reformed Protestantism, which persists until today, and 
which in turn has changed preferences? Though the results in Boppart et al. (2008) 
suggest that in Switzerland the literacy channel mattered only before urbanization, 
it is nontheless interesting to investigate whether there are any differences in educa-
tion. While we find some evidence that those on the Protestant side of the border 
tend to achieve on average higher degrees, there is also evidence that they perform 
less well in standardized PISA tests. This suggests that in the Swiss setup, educa-
tion is not as important as Becker and Woessmann (2009) have shown it to be in 
nineteenth century Prussia.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BW 10 km
ITT −8.68*** −4.08*** −4.66*** 3.51*** 0.07***
(1.33) (0.92) (0.78) (1.26) (0.01)
IV −11.95*** −5.62*** −6.41*** 4.84*** 0.10***
(1.77) (1.22) (1.04) (1.75) (0.01)
Observation 208 208 208 208 208
BW 20 km
ITT −9.78*** −4.24*** −5.74*** 4.60*** 0.07***
(1.03) (0.72) (0.62) (1.30) (0.01)
IV −12.94*** −5.62*** −7.60*** 6.08*** 0.10***
(1.31) (0.92) (0.78) (1.72) (0.01)
Observations 305 305 305 305 305
Notes: The table presents reduced form (ITT) and second stage (IV) estimates for the alternative bandwidths 10 km 
and 20 km. “Distance” is walking distance to the closest border point in kilometers. Preferences in columns 1, 2, 
and 3 are averages of the respective referenda listed in Table 1 of the online Appendix. Column 4 uses the average 
across the years 1980–2000 of each municipality’s pre-tax income divided by the number of taxpayers. Column 5 
uses the Gini coefficient of income inequality, taken from Ecoplan (2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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V. Conclusion
We have shown that in a 100 percent Reformed Protestant municipality, sup-
port for more leisure is predicted to be about 13, support for more redistribution 5 
and support for intervention about 6 percentage points lower than in a 100 percent 
Roman Catholic municipality. When pondering the substantial importance of these 
differences, one needs to keep in mind that the referenda are not just survey ques-
tions, but that the majority preference will be implemented as policy. But aggrega-
tion and implementation happen at the federal level. Thus, Protestant and Catholic 
municipalities often vote differently, yet in all areas for which the decision power is 
at the federal level they end up with the same policy, the one which finds a majority 
in Switzerland as a whole. In this sense, the resulting differences in economic out-
comes are to be interpreted as lower bounds on the differences we would see if the 
two areas had completely separate political systems.
The findings on preferences for leisure lend empirical support to Max Weber’s 
famous hypothesis of a “Protestant work ethic.” Although the prior work on this 
issue by Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Cantoni (2010) does not use a direct 
measure of preferences, their findings did suggest no role for a “work ethic.” In 
view of Max Weber’s arguments, a plausible explanation for this difference is that 
their focus was on Lutheran Protestantism, whereas we—like Weber—focus on 
Reformed Protestantism.
Going beyond the “work ethic” hypothesis, we show that Weber’s classic can be 
seen to argue that the different religions will also lead to different political prefer-
ences, and our empirical results confirm this. They also confirm, in a quasi-exper-
imental setting, the result in Alesina and Giuliano (2010), whereby Protestantism 
leads to weaker and Catholicism to stronger preferences for redistribution. It is 
important to stress that these preferences concern specifically government-organized 
redistribution, but they need not mean less solidarity overall, since government-run 
redistribution may be substituted for by more private or church charity, as shown for 
instance in Hungerman (2005) or Gruber and Hungerman (2007).
There is some suggestive evidence that the different preferences also mani-
fest themselves in differences in economic outcomes. This is not obvious a pri-
ori, because despite differences in voting, municipalities end up with the same 
federal policies in many areas.16 Furthermore, differences in labor supply need 
not fully translate into differences in actual work, if employees in both areas face 
the same labor demand, and hours and wages are federally regulated or negotiated 
on a regional or federal level.17 Thus, Swiss sociologist Geser (2008), in refer-
ence to Max Weber, argues that we should expect religious influences to shine 
through strongest in politics and less so on economic issues, where market forces 
16 There are also policy areas where different cantons (states) can make different choices, for instance in choos-
ing their tax rates. In this paper we have however focused on referenda at the federal level, as we need outcome 
variables comparable across all municipalities in our sample.
17 Details on federal regulation can be found on the Swiss government’s website for small and medium enter-
prises, www.kmu.admin.ch, and those on contracts between unions and employer associations are available from 
the Swiss Ministry of Economics, http://www.seco.admin.ch.
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will enforce greater equalization.18 Finally, our referendum results are based only 
on Swiss citizens and only on those who vote: these may have stronger opinions 
than those who abstain, yet it is those who vote who shape policies at the fed-
eral level. When we look at average income, by contrast, results are based on all 
inhabitants. Despite these arguments, we do find some suggestive evidence that 
historically Protestant municipalities have higher income per capita, and have even 
higher income inequality. In line with that, results in the online Appendix find some 
micro-level evidence that Protestants tend to retire later than Catholics, but these 
results as well are rather noisy and hence only suggestive.
On a more general level, our findings show that culture does matter for political 
and economic outcomes. These preferences cannot be judged as good or bad. By 
contrast, it is only through such preferences that economic outcomes can be evalu-
ated. The high persistence of differences in preferences suggests that if economic 
policy is to maximize social welfare, it will typically have to take preferences into 
account and as given. Finally, our results underline the benefits of a federal system 
in which regions with different cultural backgrounds are able, in at least some areas, 
to choose different policies.
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